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ADVANCING DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
BY STEPHEN L. MIKOCHIK*
INTRODUCTION
For over a quarter century, the "deinstitutionalization move-
ment"' has achieved the transfer of countless retarded persons
from large, congregate-care facilities to family-style residences in
the community.2  Whether this movement is constitutionally
required raises questions which the Supreme Court is likely to
decide since the impact of deinstitutionalization on the adminis-
tration of state mental retardation programs has been too great for
the Court to avoid the issue much longer.3 The theories which
lower courts have previously used to support deinstitutionalization
orders - least restrictive alternative analysis4 and the inherent
* J.D., Fordham Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School; Associate Professor, Temple
University School of Law. The author appreciates the invaluable assistance in preparing
this article provided by Temple University School of Law, and especially by Barbara
Berreski, Amy Lundy Brennen, Vika Gardner, and Cathy Musco.
1. Note, Group Homes and Deinstitutionalization: The Legislative Response To
Exclusionary Zoning, 6 VT. L. REV. 509 (Fall 1981). It was there noted that:
In February 1963, President Kennedy sent a message to Congress urging
establishment of a nationwide network of community-based health services. His
hope was that "within a few years ... [and with] . .. the redirection of state
resources from state mental institutions ... [we would] ... achieve [the] goal of
having community-centered mental health services readily accessible to all."
Id. at 509 & n.l.
For descriptions of the "Deinstitutionalization Movement" and its origins, see Costello
and Preis, Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative: A Constitutional Right to Treatment for
Mentally Disabled Persons in the Community, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1527, 1531 n.20 (1987);
Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian The-
ory, 31 EMORY L.J., 375, 378-87 (1982). See also S. VITELLO & R. SOSKIN, MENTAL RETAR-
DATION: ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 23-38 (1985).
2. See, e.g., Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Center, No. 85-C-437-E (N.D.
Oki. July 24, 1987XWESTLAW, 1987 WL 27104, p. 55 of llOXnot reported in F.
Supp.Xorder to place residents of institution into appropriate community alternative at a
rate of 125 persons per year); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 240-41 (D.N.H.
1981Xpresumption against deinstitutionalization of severely and profoundly retarded
residents shall cease, community placements shall be made on an individualized basis;
defendants shall develop program of community residences and residential care);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd
on other grounds, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981Xfederal district court
enjoined Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide suitable community living
arrangements for all retarded residents of Pennhurst State School and Hospital). See also S.
VITELLO & R. SOSKIN, supra note 1, at 35 (Halderman v. Pennhurst decisions had a
significant impact on the deinstitutionalization of mentally retarded persons).
3. Cf. Schwartz & Constanzo, Compelling Treatment in the Community: Distorted
Doctrines and Violated Values, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1329, 1377-97 (1987xjudicial
implementation of community treatment for the mentally ill is problematic due to legal,
economic, and bureaucratic barriers).
4. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1315-20: "Once admitted to a state [retardation]
facility, the residents have a constitutional right to be provided with minimally adequate
habilitation under the least restrictive conditions consistent with the purpose of
commitment." Id. at 1319 (citations omitted). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
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untherapeutic nature of institutional confinement 5 - may well
prove unpersuasive to the Supreme Court given its decision in
Youngberg v. Romeo.6 In addressing claims made against institu-
tional conditions, the Court in Romeo prescribed a lax standard of
judicial review which is potentially applicable to claims against
institutionalization itself.7
It is difficult to predict how catastrophic a ruling against dein-
stitutionalization would actually be for the future of retarded per-
sons. Although preference for community placement has recently
increased among professionals,8 this trend may falter without con-
stitutional compulsion behind it. In the past, community training
gave way to institutionalization,' and this development could
again occur in times to come.' °
This article will suggest an approach to deinstitutionalization
more likely than past theories to be judicially persuasive because it
is more consistent with the Court's view of its general role in
enforcing the substantive due process and equal protection safe-
guards of the fourteenth amendment. This approach, similar to
judicial review of agency action," will seek simply to insure that
professional judgment was in fact exercised without requiring the
reviewing court to second-guess the propriety of any treatment
prescribed.' 2 First, however, the article will explain why the two
(1960) (first amendment case in which Supreme Court struck down Arkansas statute
requiring every teacher to file affidavit listing all organizations to which teacher belonged
or contributed). The Court held that:
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.
Id. at 488 (citations omitted).
5. See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1318 (quoting Mason and Menolascino, The Right to
Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10
CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 156-57 (1976)). "'Institutions, by their very structure - a closed
and segregated society founded on obsolete custodial models - can rarely normalize and
habilitate the mentally retarded citizen to the extent of community programs created and
modeled upon the normalization and developmental approach components of
habilitation.'" Id.
6. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
7. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a discussion of Youngberg v. Romeo,
see infra notes 24 to 33 and accompanying text.
8. Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at pp.13, 37-39, 40-41; Garrity, 522 F. Supp. at
195; Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1311, 1313.
9. See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1318. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 462-63 (1985XMarshall J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10. Costello and Preis, supra note 1, at 1532-33.
11. For a description of judicial review of agency action, see infra note 107.
12. Applying an analysis to treatment decisions, similar to judicial review of agency
action, was first suggested by Chief Judge Bazelon in his seminal opinion in Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 454-56 (1966). See also Bazelon, Forward, the Right to Treatment
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
current deinstitutionalization theories are in doubt.
I. CURRENT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION THEORIES
A. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
One theory supporting deinstitutionalization rests on the
premise that the "massive curtailment of liberty '"13 caused by
institutionalization is justified only when no less drastic alternative
is available to meet the state's commitment objectives. 14 Thus,
where retarded persons can receive requisite care and treatment
in community residences, such placements are required, if com-
mitment is to continue, as a less restrictive environment to
institutionalization. 15
Least restrictive alternative analysis, upon which this first the-
ory relies, is a familiar constitutional doctrine. 6 The Supreme
Court has applied it in varied contexts, for example, to strike down
state regulations which required teachers to disclose their organi-
zational affiliations, 7 which forbade married couples from using
contraceptives,' 8 and which imposed a year's residency require-
ment for voting1 9 and for public health benefits.2" The concept
may be viewed as a "principle of conservation:" a principle that
the rights abridged are so important that the Court will overcome
its usual reluctance to scrutinize the propriety of legislative means
and require means which are not only effective but which will con-
serve as much of the abridged rights as possible. 2' It may also be
viewed as an assurance of legislative good faith in that scrutiny of
means is required to insure against a secondary legislative agenda
of abridging rights for their own sake.22 In either event, the prin-
Symposium, 57 G.D.L.J. 676, 678 (1969); Bazelon, Preface, Symposium, Mentally Retarded
People and the Law, 31 STAN. L. REv. 541, 542-43 (1979).
13. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
14. Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319-20 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (when fundamental personal liberties are
threatened, state must employ less drastic means for achieving substantial governmental
purpose).
15. See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1319-20.
16. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156 (l1th Ed. 1985); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (2d ed. 1983Xleast restrictive means test has been applied
outside the area of personal rights, for example, to state regulation affecting interstate
commerce).
17. Shelton, 364 U.S. 479.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
20. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
21. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
22. Intensive "means scrutiny" has served as a judicial technique to flush out illicit
secondary motives underlying legislative enactments. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for
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ciple represents the accommodation that the Court requires
between individual freedom and the needs of an organized soci-
ety, by concluding that some rights are so important that they are
not removed from judicial concern merely because the govern-
ment has made an initial showing of genuine need.2 3
The Supreme Court, however, has placed least restrictive
alternative analysis aside in examining conditions of the institu-
tional confinement of retarded persons. Apparently for the Court
in Youngberg v. Romeo,24 valid commitment has rendered these
issues primarily medical, thus beyond judicial expertise.23
In Romeo, a retarded resident of a state institution claimed
that he was subjected to excessive physical restraint.26 Writing for
the Court, Justice Powell observed that " '[]iberty from bodily
restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty pro-
tected by the due process clause .... "27 Furthermore, that right
was not extinguished by valid commitment.28 Yet, plaintiff's claim
received far less scrutiny than afforded other important rights
outside an institutional context.29 Instead of permitting physical
restraint only for use as a last resort, which least restrictive alterna-
tive analysis would require, Justice Powell instructed lower courts
to defer substantially on these matters to the decisions of qualified
professionals. 30
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982Xchallenge to sex-discriminatory admissions
policy of nursing school). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976XStevens, J.
concurringXchallenge to sex-discriminatory age restrictions on sale of 3.2% beer).
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499-501 (Harlan, J., concurringXchallenge to state prohibition
of use of contraceptive by married couples).
24. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
25. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
26. 457 U.S. at 315-16. He also claimed that the state had not provided him with safe
conditions and with the treatment required to lessen his harmful behavior and his need for
restraints. Id. at 315.
27. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 315 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)).
29. Compare the "substantial departure" test developed in Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323
(treatment decisions by appropriate professionals are presumed valid unless shown to be a
substantial departure from accepted professional standards) with, for example, the tests
adopted in other non-economic substantive due process cases, like Griswold, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (regulation infringing upon marital privacy must be narrowly drawn to advance
compelling state interests).
30. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322-323. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Romeo
explained the Court's approach as follows:
[R]espondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In this case, the
minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is such training as may
be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom
from unreasonable restraints. In determining what is "reasonable" - in this and
in any case presenting a claim for training by a State - we emphasize that courts
must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By
so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions,
interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these
institutions should be minimized. Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
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Physical freedom, as the core of liberty, surely merits no less
scrutiny than other basic aspects of liberty which the Court has
elsewhere recognized. Even where subject to compelling state
interests, such fundamental rights remain protected from unnec-
essarily broad restraint.3 1 Likewise, institutionalization may val-
idly curtail physical freedom; but that fact alone does not remove
the extent of restraint from close judicial review, unless, as Justice
Powell seems to assume, valid commitment renders the matter
primarily medical.3 2 In short, least restrictive alternative analysis,
with its emphasis on the constitutional importance of the rights
involved, is inapplicable since the Court evidently views issues of
institutional confinement as beyond judicial competence to scruti-
nize strictly.33 Without more, the Court is not likely to regard
questions of deinstitutionalization as any less medical or any more
fitting for exacting review.
B. ADEQUATE TREATMENT
It has also been argued that deinstitutionalization is required
to insure adequate treatment.34 This second theory presumes a
right to treatment,35 usually to insure that institutionalization is
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making
such decisions....
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a [qualified] professional, is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the
professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment.
Id. at 322-23 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also DeShaney, 108 S. Ct. at 1005 n.7
(1989).
31. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
32. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322-23. For a pertinent quotation from Justice Powell's opinion,
see supra note 30.
33. See S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY OF RETARDED PEOPLE 61-69 (1983XSupreme
Court deference to doctors pre- and post-commitment).
34. See Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at pp. 13, 37-39, 40-41 (evidence
overwhelming that, regarding programs for retarded persons, small is better); Halderman,
446 F. Supp. at 1318 (institutions are antithetical to the proper habilitation of mentally
retarded citizens).
35. Although the Court in Romeo did not reach whether a general right to treatment
was enforceable under the due process clause, Romeo, 457 U.S. at 318. But see id. at 325-26
(Blackmun, J., concurring), it did recognize a more limited right where treatment was
required to protect civilly committed persons' identifiable liberty interests, like freedom
from harm or from unnecessary physical restraint:
A court properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to
minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms more
familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable in light of
identifiable liberty interests and circumstances of the case. A federal court, of
course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the imposition of any
affirmative duty on a State.
Id. at 319 n. 25. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
109 S. Ct. 998 (1989Xcounty social service agency not liable for the severe abuse of its minor
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rationally related to the care and treatment purposes of commit-
ment, 6 and that, for treatment to be constitutionally adequate, it
must conform to present professional practice which includes
"normalization, ' 37 placing retarded persons in the most normal
setting appropriate to their needs, as the generally accepted
means for providing effective training.38 Under this theory, insti-
tutionalization is considered inherently untherapeutic since it is
antithetical to a normal environment.3 9 As a general challenge to
institutionalization, however, this approach appears more rigorous
than the requirements of Romeo where the Supreme Court pre-
sumed that decisions made by qualified professionals were valid
and thus beyond judicial scrutiny unless such a substantial depar-
ture from accepted practice as to show that they were not bona
fide exercises of professional judgment.
40
client while in his father's custody). The Court in DeShaney reaffirmed that "the substan-
tive component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the state to
provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such services as are necessary to
ensure their 'reasonable safety' from themselves and others." Id. at 1005 (citations omit-
ted). The Court further noted, without deciding, that "several courts of appeals have held,
by analogy to... Youngberg, that the state may be held liable under the due process clause
for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hand of their foster
parents." Id. at 1006 n.9 (citations omitted). Arguably, deinstitutionalizing retarded persons
to community residences is sufficiently analogous to placing children in foster homes to
implicate the state's affirmative duty to provide needed services. Id.
36. See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1315 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1973)); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972Xfailure to provide
adequate treatment to person confined for purpose of therapy violates due process). See
also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1973Xdue process requires that commitment
bear reasonable relation to purpose for which the individual is committed).
37. P. Roos, Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY
DISABLED PERSONS, 23-24 (P.L.I., Mental Health Law Project, 1979Xfootnote omitted). Dr.
Philip Roos is a national expert on mental retardation who has testified extensively on the
conditions of institutional confinement. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391
n.7 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1303. Describing "normalization," he
wrote:
Retarded persons should live like non-retarded persons to the greatest degree
possible. Deviancy can be reduced by minimizing the degree to which persons
are treated differently from "normal" persons. Conversely, to the degree that
they are grouped together and segregated from others, they will tend to behave
differently. Hence facilities which differ from culturally normative living
arrangements will generate behavior which deviates from the cultural norm.
This principle, referred to as NORMALIZATION has been defined... as: "...
[u]tilization of means which are as culturally normative as possible, in order to
establish and/or maintain personal behaviors and characteristics which are as
culturally normative as possible."
P. Roos, supra at 23-24.
38. See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1318 (citing Mason & Menolascino, The Right to
Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10
CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 156-57 (1976)).
39. Id. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 734-35 (Court had substantial doubts
whether institutional treatment would aid accused in attaining competency given the state
of most mental institutions).
40. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323. For a discussion of deference to professional judgments in
post-Romeo decisions, see Youngberg and Pennhurst 11 Revisited - Part II, in 10 MENTAL
AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY 'LAw REPORTER 258-60 (1986).
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The Supreme Court's perception that an issue is primarily
medical, however, should not necessarily place it beyond all mean-
ingful judicial review. For instance, in the education context,
"another area in which [the] Court's lack of specialized knowledge
and experience counsels [restraint]"4 and in which review typi-
cally resembles the Romeo standard,4 2 the Court has, nonetheless,
overcome its reluctance and carefully scrutinized matters where
the constitutional issues were especially grave:
[while] the responsibility for public education is primarily
the concern of the States ... such responsibilities, like all
other state activity, must be exercised consistently with
federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state
action... [t]he right of a student not to be segregated on
racial grounds... is... so fundamental and pervasive that
it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.4 3
II. FREEDOM FROM SEGREGATION
It is beyond the scope of this article to chronicle the Supreme
Court's approach to desegregation. It is sufficient to observe that,
proceeding from the anti-caste objective 44 of the fourteenth
amendment 45 the Court's position had evolved by the time of
Brown v. Board of Education 46 into a justification for intense scru-
tiny of racial segregation in public schools. The Court in Brown
held segregation of public education violative of equal protection,
concluding that "separate but equal" was "inherently unequal
47
since " '.. . the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.' "48 The Court in
Bolling v. Sharpe4 9 also found racial segregation unconstitutional
under the fifth amendment due process clause, ruling that "segre-
gation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
41. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
42. Id. ("[t]he very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide
public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to
tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect." (citations omitted)).
43. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
44. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982) (denial of public education to minor
children of illegal aliens creates a permanent caste or subclass of illiterates). The Court in
Plyler stated that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than
the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation." Id. at 213.
45. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
48. Id. at 494.
49. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
1989] 149
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governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro [public
school] children.., a burden that constitutes an arbitrary depriva-
tion of their liberty in violation of the due process clause."50
Like the segregation of black school children, the institutional-
ization of retarded persons also involves constitutional considera-
tions arguably justifying heightened judicial scrutiny. As Justice
Marshall observed in his partial concurrence and dissent in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center :51
[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to a "lengthy
and tragic history" . . . of segregation and discrimination
that can only be called grotesque .... A regime of state-
mandated segregation and degradation [of retarded per-
sons] ... emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled,
and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow.
Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the
retarded for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the
retarded and "nearly extinguish their race. 52
Admittedly, courts should not treat classifications based on
race and those based on retardation identically. 53 Given our his-
tory of slavery, race prejudice in this country is unique; and race is
rarely relevant 54 to any proper governmental objective.55 Thus,
disadvantaging racial classifications raise intense suspicion about
government's underlying motives, 56 requiring clear evidence of its
good faith. Such classifications are strictly scrutinized: they must
further an overriding objective in order for government to prove
that it acted in spite of and not because of the resulting harm to
racial minorities5 7 In addition, such "legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."'15  In contrast, absent a reason to suspect government's
motives, courts employ traditional rational basis analysis where
50. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
51. 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985XMarshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985XMarshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in partXcitations omitted).
53. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp.. 171, 206, 207 (D.N.H. 1981Xracial discrimination
model falters in developmentally disabled context). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
partXidentifying striking parallels between the treatment of blacks and of retarded
persons).
54. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968XBlack, Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
concurring).
55. Id.
56. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
57. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967).
58. Palmore, 446 U.S. at 432-33; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
[Vol. 65:143
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they merely insure that classifications conceivably further some
grant of lawful authority.59
Denials of community placement, however, warrant more
than minimal scrutiny. The Supreme Court has not reserved all
forms of heightened scrutiny for racial classifications. 60 Where gov-
ernment handicaps groups,61 "saddled with.., disabilities, or sub-
jected to . . . a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness," the Court
will provide some measure of "protection from the majoritarian
political process." 2 Given the brutal treatment which institution-
alized persons have suffered 63 and the disfavor in which segrega-
tion is constitutionally held, 4 some critical review should be
required to insure that decisions to continue institutionalization
actually further habilitation of and not animus towards retarded
persons.
In his partial concurrence and dissent, Justice Marshall
observed in Cleburne that "lengthy and continuing isolation of the
retarded has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and stere-
otyping that long have plagued them."'6 5 Although Justice White,
writing for the Court in Cleburne, did not share the intensity of
this historical view,6 6 it would be a mistake to conclude that the
59. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
60. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976Xsex discrimination); Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977Xdiscrimination against illegitimate children).
61. id.
62. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). The Court has
fashioned an intermediate "standard of review, which is less demanding than 'strict
scrutiny' but more demanding than the standard rational relation test," to address quasi-
suspect classifications. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 100 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1988).
This protection entails insuring that such classifications substantially further important
governmental objectives. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982Xgender); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983Xillegitimacy). The Court in Kadrmas
observed that intermediate scrutiny "has generally been applied only in cases that involved
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy." 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
Nevertheless, although Justice White's majority opinion in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), stated that retarded persons were not a quasi-suspect
class, id. at 442, a majority arguably agreed upon an approach approximating intermediate
scrutiny. See text infra at 12. In any event, even Justice White applied a level of review in
Cleburne more demanding than the "standard rational relation test." See text infra at 13-
15.
63. See, e.g., S. HERR, supra note 33, at 22-28 (during the eugenics movement,
"prominent professionals identified the retarded as a social menace and urged their
confinement for life").
64. The Supreme Court's concerns over segregation have continued in other than
racial contexts. For example, in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982),
the Court invalidated a single-sex admissions policy which served to perpetuate stereotypic
career roles for women. Id. at 729.
65. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 448. Although Justice Stevens joined Justice White's opinion, nonetheless, he
filed a separate concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Burger, which advanced a distinct
equal protection theory. Id. at 451.
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case, therefore, precludes reliance on the Supreme Court's special
judicial concern for segregation to justify some heightened scru-
tiny of deinstitutionalization decisions.
III. SCRUTINIZING CLEBURNE
In Cleburne, the application of a zoning ordinance resulting in
denial of a special use permit for a group home housing several
retarded persons was held unconstitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause by a unanimous Supreme Court, which, however,
divided sharply on the appropriate standard for review."
Although denying retarded persons status as a quasi-suspect
class,68 Justice White, in an opinion for the Court joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and
O'Connor, nonetheless, held application of the ordinance invalid,
purporting to rely on traditional rational basis analysis.69 Justice
Marshall's partial concurrence and dissent, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Blackmun, applied the intermediate scrutiny developed
in the gender discrimination cases,7 ° requiring classifications,
which handicap retarded persons, substantially to further some
important state objective. 71 Justice Stevens filed a separate concur-
rence, joined by Chief Justice Burger, rejecting any multi-tiered
approach to equal protection and resorting instead to a unitary
"rational" standard:
The term "rational," of course, includes a requirement
that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that
the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvan-
taged class. Thus, the word "rational" - for me at least
- includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that
must always characterize the performance of the sover-
eign's duty to govern impartially.72
Application of Justice Stevens' standard, however, would in
practice come far closer to intermediate scrutiny than to tradi-
tional rational basis analysis. Using this standard in the gender
context, he has generally voted with the liberal wing of the
67. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448, 452, 460.
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id. at 448.
70. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976).
71. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460.
72. Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
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Court.7 3 Moreover, when the standard is applied to those who
have suffered historic discrimination such as blacks, women, aliens,
illegitimates and apparently mentally retarded persons, it is
restated as whether "... a rational member of the disadvantaged
class could ever approve of the discriminatory application ... .
Thus, to be convinced, a rational member of the disadvantaged
class' must be persuaded that the presumptions about his group
which underlie the statute are generally valid and that the public
good likely furthered outweighs the harm to class members, a
train of thought quite similar to intermediate scrutiny.75
The opinions of Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens in
Cleburne arguably constitute the majority position, which, in
application, if not in form, approximates intermediate scrutiny.
The predictive quality of this approach is uncertain, however,
given the appointment of Justice Scalia to fill the vacancy caused
by Chief Justice Burger's retirement, Justice Rehnquist's selection
as Chief Justice, and the appointment of Justice Kennedy to
replace Justice Powell.7 6 It thus becomes necessary to meet Jus-
tice White's opinion on its own terms.
Justice White rejected intermediate scrutiny on the grounds
that retarded persons now have meaningful access to political safe-
guards, rendering intense judicial concern unnecessary.7 Even if,
as he assumes, advocates can adequately protect the interests of
retarded persons in the relatively open arena of zoning board
hearings, the isolation of most institutions and the lack of regular
oversight by family and friends7 8 renders residents more in need
73. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981XBrennan, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which White and Marshall, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting
opinion); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976XBrennan, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion). But see
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981XRehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens, JJ., joined).
74. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-28 (1982).
76. Cf. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
77. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
78. See Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1302-03. See also S. HERR, supra note 33 at 4. Dr.
Herr would not agree with Justice White's characterization of the status of retarded
persons:
Among all minorities suffering discriminations, the retarded are the least able to
assert their rights. In practice, their rights are often abrogated without due
process of law. They exercise little direct political power. Those who are in
institutions have no jailhouse lawyers to file court petitions for freedom or
correction of barbaric indignities. With training and support in making and
expressing choices, many retarded persons can speak up for themselves. For the
most part, however, those in congregate care rely on others to be their advocates
and to assist them in claiming their rights and equal opportunities.
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of judicial protection from arbitrary governmental decision-
making.7 9
Perhaps, Justice White's basic concern was that intermediate
scrutiny would force the Court to evaluate differences among
retarded persons, a task for which it lacked expertise.8 0 Although
forestalling invocation of intermediate scrutiny, this concern was
not sufficient to deter him from applying some measure of height-
ened review. This was clear from the two cases, United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno"' and Zobel v. Williams 2
which he cited in framing the applicable standard.8 3
In Moreno, the government was required to show that a Food
Stamp Act amendment restricting eligibility to households of
related persons was actually premised on legitimate purposes to
offset a suspicion raised by the legislative record that it was
intended to harm politically unpopular groups.8 4 After concluding
in Zobel that the Alaska scheme for distributing state oil profits
among its citizens based on length of residence was actually per-
verse in relation to the proffered goal of encouraging new resi-
dents to remain, 5 the Supreme Court was unwilling to envision
further justifications, rejecting the state's additional claim of
rewarding long-time residence as an invalid penalty on recent
interstate travel.8 6 These decisions certainly involve higher scru-
tiny than found in cases, like McGowan v. Maryland, applying
traditional rational basis analysis, where any conceivably legiti-
mate justification would preserve the statute unless the challenger
could prove it wholly irrational. 88
79. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972Xconsidering number of persons
committed to institutions, Court found remarkable the lack of litigation challenging the
constitutional limits of civil commitment). Moreover, the Supreme Court in the past has
shown more concern for formal (dejure) than effects (de facto) discrimination. Compare
Brown, 347 U.S. 483, with Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). Since the zoning ordinance in Cleburne did not formally exclude retarded persons
from the community (but plainly did so in effect by withholding from many their only
realistic option for living outside an institution, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460-61, (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)), Justice White's opinion may not preclude
heightened scrutiny where government formally segregates, for example, by deciding not
to deinstitutionalize.
80. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43.
81. 413 U.S. 528 (1973Xamendment to Food Stamp Act which rendered ineligible any
household containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the household
violated the fifth amendment due process clause).
82. 457 U.S. 55 (1982XAlaska's dividend distribution plan violated equal protection
guarantees).
83. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
84. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35.
85. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-62, & n.9 (1982).
86. Id. at 63.
87. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
88. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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In both Moreno and Zobel, the Court placed the burden on
the government to make some factual showing of legitimacy. That
requirement was carried forward in the standard actually applied
by Justice White in Cleburne. Unlike traditional rational basis anal-
ysis where the Court conjures up possible justifications,8 9 Justice
White required that the record reveal some "rational basis for
believing that the [group] home would pose any special threat"9 °
before he would affirm defendant's denial of the use permit:
[T]his record does not clarify how . . . the characteristics
of the intended occupants of the [group] home rationally
justify denying to those occupants what would be permit-
ted to groups occupying the same site for different
purposes.91
Absent some factual showing by defendant justifying why the
group home was denied while other uses, like nursing and board-
ing homes, were freely permitted, Justice White was willing to
assume that "an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded" had motivated defendant's actions.92
Although unwilling to regard retarded persons as a quasi-sus-
pect class, Justice White was evidently not so persuaded that they
lived free from prejudice93 that he abandoned all meaningful scru-
tiny. He required that defendant set forth in the record a factual
predicate justifying denial of the use permit to confirm that it had
acted in good-faith. A like showing will now be advanced for other
decisions affecting retarded persons, especially those denying
deinstitutionalization.
89. Id. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
90. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
91. Id. at 450.
92. Id.
93. The National Association for Retarded Citizens argued in Cleburne that:
The animus that supported segregation of the "feeble-minded" bore
unmistakable similarity to the animus that evoked Jim Crow.... Champions of
life-long segregation for retarded people explicitly invoked the then-exploding
prejudice against black people. For example, in 1903, Martin W. Barr, President
of the American Association of Medical Officers for Institutions for Idiotic and
Feeble-Minded Persons, addressed the virtues of "life-long custodial service" in
retardation institutions in these terms:
[Tihey partake of the industrial and manual training given in the antebellum
days on the plantation, which were in fact - as the world is fast acknowledging
- training schools for a backward race, many of whom are feble-minded.
The recitation of the arguments supporting life-long institutional segregation of retarded
people matched the recitation on behalf of Jim Crow... (footnote omitted). Amicus Curiae
Brief for National Association for Retarded Citizens at 16-17, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985XNo. 84-468).
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IV. MEANINGFUL SCRUTINY
Under Romeo, treatment decisions are presumed valid if the
treating professionals were qualified to make them.9 4 This defer-
ence would not be undermined if plaintiffs were allowed in rebut-
tal to show that the treatment decisions lacked an adequate factual
predicate.9 5 A court may transgress concerns about judicial com-
petency by second-guessing treatment prescriptions; but requiring
that those decisions rest on an adequate factual basis seeks simply
to prevent arbitrariness by insuring that professional judgment
was in fact exercised. 6 This, after all, is what the substantial
departure test in Romeo purports to do.
Parham v. JR.9" sheds light on what the Supreme Court
would consider an adequate factual basis for the exercise of profes-
sional judgment. The Court in Parham reviewed the constitution-
ality of Georgia's procedures for civilly committing minors at their
parents' request.98
Although holding that formal hearings were not required,99
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, nevertheless, discussed
certain factors needed to make the minors' commitment constitu-
tional.'00 Those factors directed that a valid commitment must
94. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
95. See Thomas S. By Brooksv. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178, 1196 (W.D.N.C.
1988Xtendency among human service professionals in state psychiatric institutions to
conform recommendations for habilitation to constraints imposed by state's inadequate
service delivery system).
96. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986). In this case, the 4th
Circuit found that the state had ignored the recommendations of professionals who had
evaluated the plaintiff's training and treatment needs. Id. The trial court was found to have
correctly followed the Youngberg v. Romeo "substantial departure" test by examining the
facts and circumstances on which the professional's recommendations were based. Id. The
4th Circuit found that the placement of the mentally retarded plaintiff was not based upon
professional judgment, but rather "based on expediency and a decision to save money." Id.
97. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
98. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 587 (1979).
99. Id. at 607. The Court again deferred to the medical expertise of health
professionals, nevertheless indicating that their judgments must have a basis in reviewable
fact. Id. at 609.
100. Id. at 606-07. Summarizing those factors, the Chief Justice wrote:
We conclude that the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a
child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently great that some kind
of inquiry should be made by a "neutral factfinder" to determine whether the
statutory requirements for admission are satisfied. That inquiry must carefully
probe the child's background using all available sources, including, but not
limited to, parents, schools, and other social agencies. Of course, the review
must also include an interview with the child. It is necessary that the
decisionmaker have the authority to refuse to admit any child who does not
satisfy the medical standards for admission. Finally, it is necessary that the
child's continuing need for commitment be reviewed periodically by a similarly
independent procedure.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
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address the client's individual needs. 1 1 Thus, commitment deci-
sions must rely on the type and sufficiency of information which
mental health professionals generally consider adequate to iden-
tify those needs." 2 The decision must be made by a qualified pro-
fessional authorized to reject commitment when not warranted. 0 3
Finally, there must be some form of periodic review to check the
propriety of the initial commitment and its continued validity,
10 4
thus preserving the individualized focus of the treatment.
These factors were meant to insure that professional judg-
ment was actually employed in making commitment decisions.
They can also apply during post-commitment review in judging
whether treatment decisions in fact reflect the exercise of profes-
sional judgment. Such decisions could thus be challenged by
showing that they were not sufficiently client-based in their formu-
lation, review, or in their execution. Challenges might proceed
along the lines followed by the United States District Court in
Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson 10 5 in
criticizing habilitation plans developed at a state institution for
retarded persons in Grafton, North Dakota. The court found that:
b. There is no provision for independent evaluation of
the plans; and
c. There are not adequate records to assist the profes-
sional staff to develop the plans; and
d. There is not sufficient staff to develop and keep an
adequate review of the plans; and
e. There is not sufficient staff to execute, keep records
on, and follow the plans; and
f. There are not sufficient facilities to allow execution of
the plans, for example, classrooms, support equip-
ment, direct care staff, and supplies.10 6
101. Id.
102. Id. at 608. Chief Justice Burger stated, "[T]he decision [whether to commit]
should represent an independent judgment of what the child requires and that all sources
of information that are traditionally relied on by physicians and behavioral specialists should
be consulted." Id.
103. Id. at 607.
104. Id. Chief Justice Burger stated, "We ... hold that a subsequent, independent
review of the patient's condition provides a necessary check against possible arbitrariness in
the initial admission decision." Id. at 607 n.15.
105. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982).
106. Id. at 479. The district court's first criticism (omitted from the text) states: "a.
The plans are not reflective of the existent state of the science of habilitation." Id. If this
means that plans must reflect the state of the art, it applies more scrutiny than authorized in
Romeo for reviewing routine treatment decisions.
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This approach, similar to judicial review of agency action, seeks
simply to insure that professional judgment was in fact exercised
without requiring the reviewing court to second-guess the propri-
ety of any treatment prescribed.'
0 7
Denials of deinstitutionalization deserve no less scrutiny. The
setting where treatment occurs can substantially affect its suc-
cess.10 Institutionalization itself, for example, can drastically alter
the quality of any treatment provided. 09 Thus, denials of deinsti-
tutionalization warrant scrutiny at least equal to other treatment
decisions, especially since they implicate the Supreme Court's per-
sistent hostility towards segregation.11°
This scrutiny requires that decisions not to deinstitutionalize
rest on an adequate exploration of the client's individual needs."'
To further this inquiry, the facility must keep records detailing
these needs" 12 as well as records explaining why the decision deny-
ing deinstitutionalization was made to allow for periodic
review.1 3  Moreover, institutionalization, to continue, must be
capable of addressing the client's identified needs. " 4 Accordingly,
should the abilities of an institutional resident regress, alternatives
to institutional care must be sought."' Additionally, the decision
107. E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL
73 (1981). The authors described judicial review of agency action as follows:
[T]he reviewing court should determine whether the agency had an adequate
factual basis for its decision. Some review of the facts may be essential if the
judicial controls on discretion are to be meaningful. Otherwise, an agency might
be able to protect itself from reversal merely by saying that it had taken account
of the relevant factors, without really considering the evidence for and against
its position.
Id. (footnote omittedXciting Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-35 n.74 (D.C. Cir.Xen banc), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976)). See supra note 12.
108. As Dr. Philip Roos observed, institutions "which differ from culturally normative
living arrangements will generate behavior which deviates from the cultural norm." P.
Roos, Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, supra note 37 at 23.
109. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 60-66 and 93 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 101 and 103 and accompanying text.
112. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 479
(1982).
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
115. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1311-12
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Center, No. 85-C-437-E (N.D.
Okl. July 24, 1987XWESTLAW, 1987 WL 27104, pp. 31-33 of 110). See S. HERB, supra note
33, at 3. Dr. Herr reports that regression is typical in large institutional settings:
Regression and deterioration, physical as well as mental, have been repeatedly
documented in these deprived environments. Because of insufficient training
and activity, many residents develop stereotyped, bizarre, or even menacing




concerning deinstitutionalization should be made by a qualified
professional authorized to reject institutionalization if no longer
warranted.'
16
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Romeo observed that, in
reviewing treatment decisions "it is incumbent on courts to design
procedures that protect the rights of the individual without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states.... 117 Thus,
professionals can accordingly reject placement options found to be
prohibitively expensive.118 Where, however, a clearly superior
option is rejected merely to save some expense, then cost rather
than the client's needs becomes the decisive factor in treatment,
thus negating the exercise of professional judgment which funda-
mentally must be client-based.11 9
The district court's order in Association for Retarded Citizens
of North Dakota v. Olson 120 illustrates the foregoing approach.
Defendants in Olson were enjoined to reduce the institutional
population at. Grafton from 850 to 450 by July 1, 1987 and to
develop a plan for deinstitutionalizing at least 200 more residents
before July 1, 1989.121 Defendants appealed only the latter
requirement, challenging it as an abuse of discretion. 122
There was no significant disagreement among the parties'
experts at trial that only 10 to 200 retarded persons in North
Dakota required institutionalization. 123 Moreover, the district
court found that the costs of community versus institutional care
116. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
117. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,322 & n.29 (1982Xquoting Parham, 442 U.S. at
608, n.16).
118. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals in
Thomas S. concluded that, although ".... lack of funds is an absolute defense to an action for
damages brought against a professional in his individual capacity..., the [Supreme] Court
[in Romeo] did not apply this precept to prospective injunctive relief." Id. (citation
omitted). It would not be fair to hold an institution's professionals personally liable for
conditions beyond their control: ". . . in such a situation, good-faith immunity would bar
liability." Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323 (citation omitted). The same considerations, however,
would not apply to limit liability to suits for injunctive relief rather than damages against
state officials with responsibility for funding the conditions in question. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed, "[o]bviously the problem of hindsight
interference with decisions made by hard-pressed professional staff members of state
mental institutions is a more serious one than that of assisting them in directing prospective
injunctive relief against appropriate state officials." Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 637
(1982Xcitation omitted).
119. Id.
120. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd and remanded in part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th
Cir. 1983).
121. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,
494-95 (D.N.D. 1982).
122. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1391
(8th Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 1392.
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were roughly equivalent.'24 This is sufficient to raise a presump-
tion in favor of community placement, provided defendants have
an opportunity to demonstrate that any given resident would be
better served within the institution.125 To argue merely that con-
tinued institutional care is not a substantial departure from
accepted practice, like the argument that equal but racially sepa-
rate instruction is not wholly devoid of educational benefit, misses
the mark since it fails to explain why, absent animus, the lesser
option would be chosen.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis employs less scrutiny than in cases
explicitly involving other fundamental rights126 or where suspect
classifications are at issue.1 2 7  It provides a more meaningful
review, however, than would ensue if the substantial departure
test were construed merely as a specific application of traditional
rational basis analysis. 128  Hopefully, this approach to reviewing
denials of deinstitutionalization will afford appropriate deference
to federalism and professional judgment while providing institu-
tionalized persons a genuine measure of protection from the lin-
gering vestiges of segregative intent.
124. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 483. In addition, the district court found less than a dozen
community home programs statewide, developed exclusively by non-profit organizations.
Id. at 483 & n.11.
125. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the remedial order based in part on the district
court's retaining jurisdiction to make any "necessary changes justice may require." Olson,
713 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). Thus, the district court could modify its reduction
order if defendants demonstrate that more than 250 residents actually require institutional
care.
126. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965XGoldberg, J.,
concurring); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
127. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11(1966).
128. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
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